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IT BECAME NECESSARY TO DESTROY MARRIAGE IN 




Deidre Bowen’s article, All that Heaven Will Allow: A Statistical 
Analysis of the Co-existence of Same Sex Marriage and Gay Matrimonial 
Bans,1 simultaneously offers two things. First, she presents an empirical 
analysis that can be summarized as “defense of marriage—you must be 
kidding.” As she points out, when states claim to be defending marriage 
by banning same-sex marriage, they distract attention from the forces 
genuinely undermining family stability. Second, she provides a pro-
found, unsettling and not quite fully developed set of implications that 
can be stated as “leave family law to the states—you really must be out 
of your mind.” The two aspects of her piece—the irrelevance of the pur-
ported defense of marriage and the role of the states in making things 
worse—are intricately linked. 
This Essay will, first, applaud Bowen’s documentation of the non-
existent relationship between Defense of Marriage Act legislation (mini-
DOMAs) and family stability. As she shows, the states that enacted mini-
DOMAs had greater family instability than non-enacting states before 
the laws were passed, and the new laws, unsurprisingly, did nothing to 
make things better. Second, this Essay will consider the implications of 
the regional variations Bowen identifies. She shows that the states that 
enacted the mini-DOMAs tend to be poorer, less educated, and more 
religious than states that did not act, and these states in fact have reasons 
to be more concerned about family stability than regions that are more 
prosperous. Third, this Essay will argue that these regional variations in 
family patterns, which might otherwise suggest deference to the states, in 
fact counsel hesitation about too much reliance on federalism. Bowen 
explains how political demagogues exploit the anxiety family change 
creates in order to create support for candidates and policies that often 
have little (or worse, counterproductive) impact on the underlying prob-
lems.
2
  This cynical creation of moral panic, however, contributes to re-
  
         †  Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School. I 
would like to thank Naomi Cahn for her comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
 1. Deirdre Bowen, All that Heaven Will Allow: A Statistical Analysis of the Co-existence of 
Same Sex Marriage and Gay Matrimonial Bans, 91 DENV. U. L. REV (forthcoming 2013). 
 2. Indeed, Karl Rove, President George W. Bush’s chief political strategist, was instrumental 
in engineering placement of many of the mini-DOMA’s on the ballot in 2004 in an effort to boost 
the turnout of voters who would then vote for Bush in a close presidential election. .See generally 
JAMES MOORE & WADE SLATER, BUSH'S BRAIN: HOW KARl ROVE MADE GEORGE W. BUSH 
PRESIDENTIAL (2003) (describing Rove’s role as Bush’s political strategist); JAMES MOORE & 
WADE SLATER, THE ARCHITECT: KARL ROVE AND THE DREAM OF ABSOLUTE POWER, (2007). 
36 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 91 
inforcing cycles of needless legislation and new efforts to find conven-
ient scapegoats. Only federal interventions are likely to address the un-
derlying causes of economic decline and protect the politically marginal-
ized; federalism, in contrast, conceals rather than illuminates the genuine 
issues underlying family change. This Essay will conclude that Bowen’s 
proposal that family policy focus on children rather than marriage, while 
certainly sensible, is unlikely to succeed. Instead, family policy is likely 
to make progress only if a new political coalition directly takes on the 
economic forces that have worsened inequality—and family instability—
in the first place.  
I. SHOWING THAT THE “DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE” IS AN OXYMORON  
Empiricists often get no respect. They must master statistical tech-
niques beyond the understanding of most legal scholars and then use the 
techniques to prove things we either suspected all along or that we refuse 
to believe when they contradict our firmly held beliefs.
3
 Nonetheless, 
there are times when proving what many of us suspected is both im-
portant and satisfying. The first part of Bowen’s article, which examines 
the impact of state efforts to “defend” marriage on the incidence of mar-
riage and divorce, is just such a satisfying study. It provides empirical 
evidence of what many of us understood from the outset: The state con-
stitutional amendments, statutes, and propositions banning same-sex 
marriage were unlikely to have much impact on family patterns and are 
better understood as cynical efforts to mobilize conservative voters.
 4
 
Bowen’s notable contribution in this article is to document the impact of 




 3. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition & Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (analyzing how motivated readers interpret empirical data in ways that 
conform to their initial beliefs); Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some 
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011).  
 4. See Bowen, supra note 2 at 34, 41,(explaining the role of “moral entrepreneurs” and 
“moral panics”). This does not necessarily mean, however, that all opponents of same-sex marriage 
are disingenuous in their beliefs. Instead, it recognizes the existence of a coalition between cynical 
strategists like Karl Rove, motivated principally by a desire to influence political turnout, and those 
who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. See generally June Carbone, What Does Bristol 
Palin have to Do with Same-Sex Marriage?, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313 (2011). One of the ways in 
which cultural opponents talk past each other is in the nature of the justifications they advance for 
their positions. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 4. Social conservatives tend to oppose same-
sex marriage because God forbids it, society has not traditionally recognized same-sex relationships, 
or they view it as unnatural. In short, they argue that same-sex intimacy is “wrong.” Indeed, in 
United States v. Windsor, Justice Scalia repeated his views that “the Constitution does not forbid the 
government to enforce traditional moral and sexual norms” precisely because they are traditional 
norms. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 599 (2003) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). On the other side, many 
would reject religious commands, tradition per se, and revulsion as grounds for state action. See 
Gerard Bradley, Stand and Fight: Don’t Take Gay Marriage Lying Down, NAT’L REV. (July 28, 
2003), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/node/211453/print (arguing that once opponents 
of same-sex marriage are required to provide reasons—as opposed to appeals to religion, tradition, 
or disgust—for their opposition, the battle will be lost).  
 5. Bowen, supra note 2 at 30. Of course, many still deny that such analyses are possible. See, 
e.g., Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor, which states that: 
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She provides a compelling statistical analysis that shows that following 
the enactment of mini-DOMAs, marriage rates fell further and divorce 
rates rose faster in states that adopted such measures than in states that 
took no such action (although she acknowledges the differences were not 
statistically significant).
6
 The legislation appears to have had little impact 
on marriage or divorce, and to the extent Bowen’s figures suggest any 
correlation, they would be counterproductive.
7
  
II.  IDENTIFYING THE REAL ISSUE UNDERLYING FAMILY CHANGE: 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
Bowen, in fact, makes no claim that the mini-DOMAs had any im-
pact on family patterns. Instead, she documents the far more important 
relationship between poverty, low education, and early marriage on fami-
ly instability.
8
 She concludes that “the decreasing relevancy of marriage 
and the larger divorce rates in DOMA states for those individuals who 
actually are married (and remarry) seem to be related directly with pov-
erty and indirectly with educational and economic opportunities.”
9
 She 




In her article, Bowen understandably does not provide a full expla-
nation for why factors such as poverty and the lack of economic oppor-
tunity affect the family. These changes are linked not just to poverty but 
to growing inequality and the decimation of stable blue collar employ-
ment. Substantial research shows that increased societal disparities, not 




Past changes in the understanding of marriage—for example, the gradual ascendance of 
the idea that romantic love is a prerequisite to marriage—have had far-reaching conse-
quences. But the process by which such consequences come about is complex, involving 
the interaction of numerous factors, and tends to occur over an extended period of time. 
We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex marriage becomes widely ac-
cepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now known and are unlikely 
to be ascertainable for some time to come. 
Windsor, supra note 5, at 2715. Alito suggests that those who oppose same-sex marriage do so in 
part because of the mere possibility of unintended consequences, such as weakening marriage, 
consequences that are difficult to measure or predict. Id. 
 6. Bowen concludes that “non-DOMA states showed a smaller decrease in marriage rates 
and a greater decrease in divorce rates compared with states that passed DOMA legislation.” Bowen, 
supra note 2.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (citing Patrick H. Caddell & Douglas E. Schoen, Romney, Obama Must Address Crisis 
of U.S. Families, OPINION POLITICO (June 12, 2012, 9:27 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77338.html).  
 11. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, FAMILY CLASSES: WHAT IS REALLY 
HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (forthcoming 2013–14) (arguing that greater inequality 
segments marriage markets, writes off a high percentage of men at the bottom as effectively unmar-
riageable, and alters the way men and women matchup); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, 
THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009) (showing in a 
cross-cultural comparison that societies with greater inequality tend to have higher teen birth rates). 
 
38 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 91 
have demonstrated, for example, that teen birth rates correlate with the 
level of inequality between the incomes at the fiftieth and tenth percen-
tiles, indicating that optimism about the future influences family pat-
terns.
12
 The result produces cycles of increasing inequality as greater 
disparities skew family form, and family form influences the resources 
available for investment in the next generation.
13
  
Bowen offers her empirical analysis of the link between economic 
conditions and family patterns less as a critique of family developments 
than to explain the political role of the mini-DOMAs. She demonstrates 
how “moral entrepreneurs” exploit public anxiety for their own ends. 
First, they define the problem, in this case the genuine decline of mar-
riage and increase in single-parent families that decrease the resources 
available to children.
14
 Second, they identify scapegoats, such as same-
sex couples, and arouse public fears about the supposed threat from these 
scapegoats.
15
 Third, they use such fears to advance their own ends, which 
often have little to do with the genuine issue—increasing inequality and 
the decline of the middle class—and no hope of making it better, whether 
the issue is defined in terms of the decline of marriage or the increased 




the same parties associat-
ed with the opposition to same-sex marriage also champion policies—
evisceration of the tax base, restriction of voting rights, disinvestment in 
infrastructure and higher education, and slashing programs for chil-
dren—likely to make the economy and the plight of the poor and the 
middle class even worse.
17
 As these policies (including the mini-
DOMAs) fail, the failure further exacerbates understandable public con-
  
See also Eric D. Gould & M. Daniele Paserman, Waiting for Mr. Right: Rising Inequality and De-
clining Marriage Rates, 53(2) J. URB. ECON. 257, 257–81 (2003). 
 12. Melissa Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Income Inequality and Early Nonmarital 
Childbearing: An Economic Exploration of the Culture of Despair (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17157, 2011); see also Melissa Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Explaining Recent 
Trends in the U.S. Teen Birth Rate (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17964, 
2012); Melissa Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Why Is the Teen Birth Rate in the United States so 
High and Why Does It Matter? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17965, 2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich 
and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS, 
STANFORD UNIV. (July 2011), 
http://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/reardon%20whither%20opportunity%20-
%20chapter%205.pdf (on the relationship between the growing gap in investment in children and 
children’s performance).  
 14. An intense debate exists about whether marriage is an important social good in its own 
right, but few dispute that the emergence of marriage as a marker of class, which skews the re-
sources available to children, contributes to growing inequality. See Bowen, supra note 2. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. For an account of such actions in the 2004 presidential election, see Todd Donovan, 
Caroline Tolbert, Daniel Smith & Janine Parry, Did Gay Marriage Elect George W. Bush? 5 (State 
Politics and Policy Conference, Jan. 2005), available at 
http://polisci.msu.edu/sppc2005/papers/fripm/dtsp_sppc05.pdf (providing an account of such actions 
in the 2004 presidential election).   
 17. See, e.g., A Comparison of Obama and Romney’s Positions on Top Issues, STAR-
TELEGRAM (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.star-telegram.com/2012/11/03/4386310/a-comparison-of-
obama-and-romneys.html. 
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cern, setting the stage for new attack on the powerless, the unpopular, 
and the marginalized.
18
 In this setting, the demonstrated ineffectiveness 
of legislation, such as the mini-DOMAs, serves to make the ground that 
much more fertile for the demagoguery that inspired it in the first place.    
III.  RECONSIDERING FEDERALISM 
Bowen’s analysis has potentially profound implications for federal-
ism, in both economical and political terms. First, it indicates that the 
states genuinely face different circumstances in dealing with the family. 
If all other things were equal, this would support leaving family law to 
the states. In the majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy approached, but then backed off, federalism as a justification 
for the opinion.
19
 Bowen’s analysis, without addressing the constitutional 
issue directly, would seem to support such an approach. Yet, at the core 
of the correlation she shows between economic circumstances and the 
family is a dynamic with the potential to produce reinforcing cycles of 
winners and losers. The winners in an era of growing inequality are those 
states that were richer to begin with and that used their riches to invest in 
the new economy. Massachusetts, for example, has long been a leader in 
research and higher education, and it is a tech center today that attracts 
highly educated migrants.
20
 Bowen’s analysis, which links both support 
for mini-DOMAs and higher rates of divorce to poverty and lack of edu-
cation, makes it unsurprising therefore that Massachusetts became one of 
the first states to adopt same-sex marriage. What Bowen doesn’t say is 
that the same analysis suggests why Massachusetts will continue to be 
wealthier than the states enacting defense of marriage measures, and the 
inequality among the states is likely to increase.
21
  
This is true, in part, because the political dynamic Bowen identifies 
is likely to make things worse in enacting states for reasons that have 
nothing to do with marriage equality. In describing the role of the moral 
  
 18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–92 (2013). Others have argued that 
economic decline creates a more fertile climate for such appeals. See, e.g., MARKUS BRÜCKNER & 
HANS PETER GRÜNER, ECONOMIC GROWTH and THE RISE OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM: THEORY and 
EVIDENCE (March 2010), available at www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7723.asp; Rory McVeigh & Ma-
ria-Elena D. Diaz, Voting to Ban Same-Sex Marriage: Interests, Values, and Communities, 74 AM. 
SOC. REV. 891 (2009) (linking strength of the vote for the mini-DOMAS to recent rises in crime or 
unemployment). 
 19. He concluded that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the federal DOMA 
that precluded federal recognition of otherwise valid state marriages constituted an unconstitutional 
interference with state authority over the family. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692–96 (2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Michael B. Sauter & Alexander E.M. Hess, America’s Best (and Worst) Educat-
ed States, FOX BUSINESS (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-
finance/2012/10/15/americas-best-and-worst-educated-states/ (showing Massachusetts has the high-
est number of college graduates). 
 21. Bowen, supra note 2. See alsoJames K. Galbraith & J. Travis Hale, The Evolution of 
Economic Inequality in the United States, 1969-2007: Evidence from Data on Inter-industrial Earn-
ings and Inter-regional Incomes (Univ. of Tex. Inequality Project, Working Paper No. 57), available 
at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/papers/utip_57.pdf. (showing that income inequality is increasing 
among regions, with the technology and finance sectors showing the greatest gains). 
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entrepreneurs who promoted the mini-DOMAs for their own ends, she 
describes political leaders who have worked systematically to divert at-
tention away from the economic changes remaking the American land-
scape.
22
 These moral entrepreneurs do not just target gays and lesbians. 
Although the Supreme Court struck down the federal legislation that 
blocked recognition of same-sex marriages in states that have authorized 
them, it also eviscerated the Voting Rights Act protection that opened the 
door to broader political participation in the states that tend to be the 
biggest supporters of traditional marriage.
23
 This suggests that the dy-
namic Bowen identifies—well-funded moral entrepreneurs who use 
demagoguery to find new political scapegoats to deflect attention—will 
continue, even if same-sex marriage ultimately wins out nationally. Re-
publican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney, after all, was caught on 
tape before an audience of wealthy donors complaining about the 47% of 
Americans who were mooching off the rest.
24
  
Federalism, to the extent that it is defined in terms of deference to 
the states, is not likely to break the downward cycle exacerbating region-
al inequality. Instead, federal intervention, both to share the dividends 
that come from the successes of the wealthier states and to protect the 
politically powerless likely to be the victims of moral scapegoating, be-
comes even more critical to national well-being. 
This means that Bowen’s proposal to focus on the well-being of 
children rather than marriage cannot succeed on its own terms. It is hard 
to stem moral panics, generated by genuine fear of downward mobility, 
with reason or a nine-point plan. Instead, fighting the political dynamic 
that seeks out moral scapegoats requires identifying the real culprits un-
derlying the cultural anxiety and creating new political coalitions. Such a 
coalition needs to take on the rise of the 1%, the weakening of the middle 
class, and the disappearance of well-paying jobs for the middle of Amer-
ican society.
25
 If such a coalition were to prevail, generating increased 
support for children would shift from politically impossible to unremark-
able; without a coalition committed to the middle of American society, 
neither protection of the politically marginalized nor improvement in 
family stability is likely to occur. 
  
 22. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010) 
(arguing that greater inequality is a function of a political system that has become less responsive to 
the needs of the middle class and the poor). 
 23. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 S. Ct. 2612, 2618–20 (2013); NAOMI CAHN & JUNE 
CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION & THE CREATION OF CULTURE 
(2010) (analyzing state views on same-sex marriage). 
 24. See David Corn, SECRET VIDEO: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He REALLY 
Thinks of Obama Voters, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-video-romney-private-fundraiser. 
 25. Indeed, Bowen acknowledges the criticism that liberals have failed to make class an issue, 
and more particularly failed to call those promoting the interests of the plutocracy to account. See 
Bowen, supra note 2. 
